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BRITISH WAR CABINETS.

D

URING the progress of the present world war there has been
a remarkable series of developments in the British Cabinet
and. ministry, involving not only many changes of personnel
but also fundamental alterations in the constitution of the Cabinet
and its relations to Parliament. An analysis of these is not only of
interest as an important phase of the history of the war, and the
evolution of political mstitutions ; but is also of value in dealing with
problems and proposals for governmental reorganization in the
United States.
THE LIBERAL CABINET

At the outbreak of the war a Liberal Cabinet was in office, with
the Rt. Hon. Henry H. Asquith as Prime Minister. But the position
of this Cabinet differed from that of the conventional description
of British institutions, in that the Liberal party did not have a majority in the House of ·commons. Indeed the two leading partiesLiberals and Unionists-were practically equal in numbers. But
the Liberal Cabinet 'vas ordinarily supported by the minor parties,
the Irish Nationalists and the Labour members.
Several Cabinet changes took place on the declaration of war.
The Prime Minister was temporarily serving as Secretary of State
for War; and this position was promptly given to Lord Kitchener,
the best known military commander in the country, but a man without experience as a Cabinet member or in active political work, and
not identified with any political party. This appointment involved
a departure from established customs in two respects,-in admitting
to the Cabinet a non-party· member, and in placing a military officer
at the head "of the War Office.
At the same time two members of the Cabinet and one undersecretary resigned, because of their objection to taking an active
part in the conduct of war. These were Viscount Morley, Lord
President of the Council; John Burns, President of the Local Gov-
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ernment Board; and C. P. Trevelyan, undersecretary of the Board
of Education.
Outside of the ministry, Ramsey MacDonald resigned his position
as chairman of the parliamentary Labour Party, because his views
on war were in conflict with the attitude of his party in supporting
the war policy of the government.
While the Cabinet remained substantially a Liberal Cabinet, a
party truce was promptly agreed to, on the basis of postponing action
on controversial party q~estions. A letter from Bonar Law, leader
of the Opposition Unionists, to the Prime Minister, assuring him of
the support of his party, was published. The customary methods
of parliamentary opposition and criticism in the House of Commons
were thus suspended; and for some months the chief and almost the
only parliamentary criticism of the government was that voiced by
individual members in the House of Lords.
Under these conditions a large amount of emergency legislation
was rapidly passed in the six weeks between the declaration of war
and the adjournment of the regular session on September 18; and
this was further supplemented at an adjourned session later in the
year 1914, and at the sessions in the following years.
Early in the session of 1915, action was taken which emphasized
the control of the Cabinet over the proceedings in Parliament. On
February 3 the government proposed a resolution taking the whole
time of the House of Commons for its measures until further notice.
"This drastic proceeding was accepted almost as a matter of course.
But it deserves to be noted as a prominent landmark in parliamentary history. For though the so-called 'parliamentary initiative' has
often fallen into practical desuetude, this is probably the first occasion in the history of any Parliament in which it has been formally
surrendered for an indefinite period."1
'
Another significant change in procedure at this session was that
the enormous votes of credit for war purposes now absorbed the
ordinary estimates for the army and navy. In every previous war,
including the Napoleonic wars, the votes of credit have represented
roughly the oifference between war expenditure and n0rmal peace
expenditure. But the army and navy estimates were now dispensed
with altogether, except for 'token' estimates of £1000 for each vote
and £100 for each appropriation in aid, as a matter of form ; and
both normal and abnormal expenditures were to be met out of votes
of credit. 2
1
Tlie Political Quarterly, No. 6 (May, 1915), pp. 141.°, 163.
' Ibid, pp. l 46-7.
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As the session of 1915 continued, evidence of uneasiness and dissatisfaction appeared both inside and outside of Parliament. The
Cabinet still received general support, and there was no open attempt
to force its retirement. But the policy of the Cabinet. lacked stability and certainty. "Where the people looked for leadership, they
found the old inclination to wait and see."3 "In the all important
matter of munitions, the Government confused and irritated the
House by alternate complacency and panic; in the matter of liquor
they embarked on an ill-considered venture, which led to inglorious
surrender; in the matter of alien enemies they were forced into a
reversal of policy by popular effervescence. These mishaps did not
bring about the change of government, but they went far to convince the doubtful that a change was inevitable."4 The resignation
of Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, on May 15,
brought to light the internal difficulties of the Government; and
helped to precipitate the crisis.
No formal action in Parliament preceded the change of government ; and what took place in private and informal conferences will
not be fully known for some time. But it has been understood that
the Unionist leaders informed Mr. Asquith that they could no
longer maintain their attitude of restraining criticism unless important changes were made. As an outcome, a reorganization of the
Cabinet was agreed to, Mr. Asquith remaining as Prime Minister,
but with the admission of a number of Unionist and Labour members, forming a Coalition.Cabinet. The Irish Nationalists were also
offered representation; but declined to serve so long as Home Rule
for Ireland was not put into effect.
THE COALITION CABINET

When formally constituted the new Coalition Cabinet consisted
of 12 Liberals, 8 Unionists, I Labour member and Lord Kitchener,
a total of 22 members, an iucrease of 2 over the old Cabinet. The
new positions were the newly created Minister of Munitions and
Lord Lansdowne, as Minister without portfolio. Unionists were
assigned to a number of important departments : A. J. Balfour became First Lord of the Admiralty; Bonar Law, Secretary for the
Colonies; Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India; W. H.
Long, President of the Local Government Board; and Edward Carson, Attorney General. Liberal members were shifted to different
s The Times History and E11cyclotetlia of tlie War. V, ch. 90, p. 319.
•Tire Polit1cal Quarterly, No. 7 (;).!arch, 1916), p. 122.
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posts: Lloyd George was transferred to the new Ministry of Munitions; Reginald McKenna became Chancellor of the Exchequer;
J_ohn Simon, Secretary of State for Home Affairs; Lord Buckmaster, Lord Chancellor; Lord Crewe, President of the Council; Lord
Selborne, President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries; and
Winston Churchill was given the sinecure post of Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster. In February, 1916, an addition was made to
the Cabinet, by creating a new Ministry of Blockade.
A Coalition Cabinet of this kind was something new in British
political history. There have been coalition cabinets before.; but
they had been only partial, and none had gone to the extent of absorbing nearly all the chief political leaders of the different parties,
representing 88 per cent of the House of Commons, and thus eliminating the organized Opposition. Mr. Asquith, writing to the Chief
Liberal Whip, said of the new arrangements :
"The transformation implies a temporary abandonment of the
system of party government which has ever since 1832 dominated
our political arrangements and which I hold to be, under normal conditions, the best adapted to our national requirements. * * * There
is one reason and one only which could justify or explain such a
new departure-a clear and urgent case of national necessity:"5
The general result was, however, called by one writer a combination of Front Bench politicians rather than a national Cabinet in the
wider sense. But the same critic considered it a definite and most
necessary step in replacing party government by a government for
war. It was undoubtedly stronger than the preceding Liberal Cabinet ; but it was "too much to expect that it would show itself permanently more efficient than its predecessor." Its membership "was
limited to the politicians, and party considerations were still the
basis of its composition;" and "it was likely to suffer, even more
than its predecessor from its own unwieldy bulk, which necessarily
hampered the swift decisions of a Cabinet in time of war." 8
Such a sweeping reconstruction of the Cabinet and Ministry, under the established law and practice, would have necessitated a considerable number of bye-elections, to permit the newly appointed
Ministers to retain their seats in the House of Commons. But as
there was general agreement that it was inadvisable to hold elections,
an act was passed suspending the law which prevented members of
the House from accepting office.
•The Times History ancl Encyclopedia of the War. V, ch. 90, p. 316.
•Ibid, pp. 314, 320.

BRITISH WAR CABINETS

475

Later, as the statutory limit for the duration of the House of Comi;nons, under the Pa;rliament Act of 19n, approached, a bill was introduced and passed extending the life of the existing House for a
few months; and similar measures have subsequently l:ieen enacted
from time' to time, so as to avoid a parliamentary election during
the war. Local elections have also been suspended in the same way,
The Coalition Cabinet promptly gave evidence of a more energetic
policy, in measures for the creation of the new Ministry of Munitions and the Munitions of War Act, and in the administrative conduct of the war. But disappointments as to the successful progress
of both military and diplomatic affairs led to gradually increasing
dissatisfaction and criticism. Paradoxically the disappearance of
any formally organized opposition was followed by more openly expressed opposing, not enough to be formidable, but troublesome
guerilla attacks, from a small group of doctrinaire Radicals and
avowed Socialists. Moreover the growing feeling of unrest was
much broader than the avowed opposition.
It was urged that the Coalition government was defective because
of the size of the Cabinet, its composition and the character of the
Prime Minister. Members of all parties acknowledged that the Cabinet was too large for the most effective action. "A body of 23
men of very unequal ability, tired by their departmental labours, and
meeting every few days for a couple of hours, was, indeed, an impossible machinery for making war." 7 As early as September, 1915,
the London Times advocated a smaller Cabinet, meeting every day,
and relieved from departmental detail.
In fact the traditional working· of the British Cabinet system had
already been altered in important respects. The public suspected.
that specific problems were ref erred formally to Cabinet committees
and that the active direction of affairs was in the hands of a small
group within the Cabinet. But there was no definite knowledge of
the extent of the control of the Cabinet over its committees or over
the de facto directing group.

The War Committee
On November 2, 1915, the Prime Minister announced that since
the beginning of the war there had been something like fifty different
committees and advisory bodies formed out of the Cabinet, though
sometimes with outside assistance. Of special importance had been
TJbid.

X, ch. 163, p. 328.
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a fluctuating body to which, by the consent of the Cabinet, questions
of state and questions of strategy had been delegated. This War
Committee was now to be established on a more formal basis and to
be limited to five or six members, including the Prime Minister, the
Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the
Minister of Munitions, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This committee should have a
staff of naval, military and diplomatic advisors and have the general
direction of war measures. The Cabinet at large was to be kept informed of its decisions and to be consulted before any new departure
in policy was undertaken. 8
This announcement gave some satisfaction, as a step in the right
direction, though criticized because the committee was composed of
department heads who would be occupied with departmental problems. Two members of the Cabinet resigned: Mr. Carson, because
he was not satisfied with the Balkan policy, and Mr. Churchill, as
he was omitted from the war committee.
In June, 1916, the size of the war committee was increased to
seven by the addition of Lord Curzon,-at the time when Mr. Lloyd
George became Secretary of War and Mr. Montagu succeeded him
as Minister of Munitions. The balance of parties in the committee
was thus preserved. In practice the Cabinet almost automatically
ratified the decisions of the committee; but the committee itself gradually expanded by the presence of official advisors and ministerial
visitors until it became almost as cumbrous a body as the Cabinet.0
Further dissatisfaction developed with the acknowledged failure
of the Dardanelles expedition and the internal conflict in the Cabinet on the question of compulsory military service. A preliminary
step in this latter direction had been taken by the passage of the
National Registration Act in June, 1915. But the first compulsory
service act, for unmarried men, was not introduced until January,
r916. This led to the resignation of Sir John Simon, Home Secretary; and for a short time the active opposition of the Labour and
Irish Nationalists in Parliament appeared probable; but the Labour
Ministers were persuaded to withdraw their resignations, and the
Nationalists adopted a neutral policy of inaction, since the measure
was not to apply to Ireland.
Proposals to e>...i:end the application of conscription developed further disagreement in the Cabinet, and when a compromise measure
s The Political Quarterly, No. 8 (Sept., 1916), p. xo4. Cf. The Committee on Imperial Defence,
482.
9 Tlie Times History and Encyclopec!iu. of the War.
X, ch. x63, p. 354-

p:
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was presented at a secret session of the House of Commons on
":.'\pril 25, so much dissatisfaction was disclosed that the proposed
bill was withdrawn and a more sweeping measure introduced early
in May.
.
The hesitancy and delay in dealing with this and other problems
led to a growing demand for a more positive leadership in the government. As one writer stated: "A coalition government above all
others should avoid the appearance of sectional and merely departmental activity. In other words the. Prime Minister should show
beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is the active director of affairs.
It is therefore unfortunate that he seemed during these few weeks
to withdraw himself from the eye of the House of Commons."10
But it should also be noted that the principle upon which the coalition was based called for a general agreement on all important questions of pqlicy; and to have forced a decision against any considerable minority would have involved a reconstruction of the Cabinet.
In spite of these difficulties the Coalition Cabinet continued in
office, with minor changes, for a year and a half, until December,
i9I6. Its record has been summed up in these words: "The Coalition government proved in almost every sphere of war direction and
war administration that it was stronger than its predecessor, but not
strong enough, that it acted more swiftly, but yet acted too late, that
its measures were better adapted to the needs of the time than the
measures of the first year of the war, but yet were almost invariably
half measures."11
THE LI,OYD GEORGE WAR CABINET AND MINISTRY

Towards the end of the year I9I6 there was another general reconstruction of the British Cabinet and Ministry, involving not only
numerous changes in personnel but fundamental alterations in the
structure of the Cabinet and in its relations to the House of Commons.
As in the case of the reorganization of May, I9I5, the change
was not ·preceded by any formal vote of the House of Commons ;
but it was the result of criticism outside of Parliament and internal
disagreement within the Coalition Cabinet. Dissatisfaction had been
growing more acute on a number of important problems, including
the most effective distribution of "man power," the reorganization
of the admiralty, more active control over shipping, and questions
of food production and control. The London Times became more
>0
11

The Political Quarterly, No. 7 (March, 1916), p. 146.
The Times History and Encyclopedia of the War. X, ch. 163, p. 325.
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active in demanding a sweeping reorganization in methods of administration.
Within the Cabinet the crisis developed on the question of
administrative reorganization. Plans were proposed for reducing
the size of the war com~ittee and giving it more definite authority,
without the need for consulting the whole Cabinet. This might have
been agreed to without a general recasting of the Cabinet but for the
specific proposal that the Prime Minister should not be a member of
the war committee. It was inevitable that Mr. Asquith should not
agree to this ; and when an attempted compromise failed, Mr. Lloyd
George resigned. 'fhis was promptly followed by the resignation of
Mr. Asquith, which necessarily involved the whole Cabinet.
On Asquith's resignation, the King first turned to Mr. Bonar Law,
the recognized leader of the Unionist party, as Mr. Asquith was of
the Liberal party. But in a short time Mr. Law reported that he
could not form a satisfactory Ministry. Mr. Lloyd George was then
called on; and after two days presented his proposed Cabinet and
Ministry, which then took office.

The War Cabinet
In the new ministry the most striking feature was the disappearance of the traditional Cabinet of department heads, and the creation
of a distinctly new type of War Cabinet of five members. This took
over the active functions of the former war committee; but instead
of being subordinate to the Cabinet, was to be the superior directing
body over the whole group of ministers. This War Cabinet was
composed of Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister; Lord Curzon,
President of the Council; Lord Milner and Mr. Arthur Henderson,
Ministers without portfolio; and Mr. Bonar Law, Chancellor of the
Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. Only the last
named held an important administrative office; and this cabinet of
five were to give their entire time to the general problems of the
war.
Executive power and responsibility were thus concentrated in the
small body of five men, in place of the unwieldy Cabinet of 23 administrative officers who were also active leaders in Parliament.
But this was accomplished by attempting to separate the functions,
formerly combined in the Cabinet, of executive control, both from
the active leaderl!hip of Parliament and from· the immediate dfrection of administrative action. The Prime Minister ceased to be the
active leader ·of the House of Commons, and attended but rarely. In
a few months Bonar Law retired from the War Cabinet, leaving no
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member of that body whose regular attendance at the House was
to be expected.
· The concentration of authority seems to have been generally approved ; but there were differences of opinion as to the form, and as
to its effect in the future. One writer remarked : "Everyone expected a much smaller Cabinet; few imagined that he would cut it down
to Five. Twenty-three was a monstrosity, for which there was no
excuse and no palliation save that the party politicians· could not
bridle their ambitions. A Cabinet of Five can be justified only as a
temporary war measure, and leaves the perpetual problem of Inner
and Outer Cabinet untouched."12
On the other hand, another observer has written : "The time imperatively calls for government by a single man, assisted by the
ablest e:>..-perts. ':' * * The idea of governing a country by a committee of men who must be unanimous in all their decisions, whether
they numb.er twenty-three or five is monstrous. After all joint responsibility in accordance with Cabinet fiction means irresponsibility.
'1\venty-three men, and even five men, cannot think and resolve alike
in all matters. * * * Although it may be thought that a war committee of five able, honest, energetic men, who are equally determined to win the war, is an ideal body for exercising the supreme
control, a dictatorship * * ~, is inevitable. * * * The logic of events
must place the. conduct of the war into the hands of a single man,
although his supremacy may be disguised by giving him a number
of colleagues, who in reality should be his subordinates. War gov:.
ernment by debating society is gone probably forever." 13
In connection with this feature of the new War Cabinet, notice
m:iy be taken of the nature of changes in some of the other countries.
In France there has also been a small war committee or council created; but this has been composed of the heads of the administrative
departments most directly involved in the conduct of the war; while
parliamentary commissions have actively cooperated with the Cabinet. In Germany, where the Chancellor has been nominally the
sole minister, but whose authority has apparently been limited by
the decisions of the heads of the military departments, there have
been some steps taken towards at least the form of consultation with
the Reichstag and a committee of that body.
Besides the concentration of authority, it may also be noted that
the new War Cabinet, unlike the former Cabinet and like the war
committee, while meeting in private, appears to have formal recor~s
12 Auditor Tantum, in Fortnightly Review, Jan., 1917, pp. 42·3.
11 Politicus, in Fortnightly Re~iew, Jan., 1917, pp. 22-3.
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taken of its proceedings, and has also its own staff of assistants and
experts, distinct from those of the administrative departments.u
Difficult problems may ·arise when the recommendations of these
staff advisers of the \Var Cabinet conflict with those of the administrative departments. Will the staff advisers of the War Cabinet be
more important than the Ministers?

The Ministry
The formation of the new War Cabinet did not abolish the ministerial positions at the head of the administrative departments. But
it materially altered the status of the ministers ; and other important changes were made in the constitution of the ministry.
In the matter of party representation both the \Var Cabinet and
the Ministry preserved the form of a Coalit!on. In the War Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George was a Liberal, Mr. Henderson a Labour
member, and the other three were Unionists. In the larger ministry, the number of Unionists and Labour members was increased;
and while there was a considerable number of Liberal ministers, none
of the most prominent Liberal members of the Asquith Cabinets remained in office. Moreover there was a significant appearance of
men of business rather than parliamentary experience, some of
whom could not be definitely assigned to any of the regular parties.
The new government was thus a coalition including more than party
elements.
On the other hand, the organization of the new ministry was followed by the reappearance of a formal opposition. Mr. Asquith
and his leading supporters took their seats in the Opposition benches,
where their attitude towards the government has been similar to that
of the Unionists towards the Liberal Cabinet during the first period
of the war.
While the new Cabinet was much smaller than the old, the new
Ministry was larger. A series of new Ministers was appointed, and
provision was made later for new departments, and a considerable
addition was made to the number of parliamentary secretaries, both
in the old and new departments. The new ministries included ministers of Labour and Pensions, a Food Controller and a Shipping
Controller. An Air Board was also created, the Presidency of
which was, however, assigned to the under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. Later additional ministers of National Service and
Reconstruction were appointed.
"There were 40 paid members of the Secretariat
Debates, 1917, Vol. 91: 598.

o~

the War Cabinet. Parliamentary
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Altogether the new ministry fom1ed a total of 88, nearly double
that of pre-war ministries. Of these 60 were members of the House
of Commons, 23 were members of the House of Lords, and 5 were
not members of either House.15 The influence of 60 salaried officials of the ministry as members of the House of Commons may well
become an appreciable factor in contjolling a majority of votes in
that House to sustain the government.
The declining importance of the House of Commons is further
indicated by the lack of attention given to it not only by the members
of the War Cabinet but also by the ministers. This is indicated by
the number of ministers not members of either House, these departments being represented only by undersecretaries. But even the
ministerial members· of the House have often been absent. It was
pointed out that during the debate on a Consolidated Fund Bill,
there was no one on the Government Front Bench except a Junior
Lord of the Treasury and later the Chief Secretary for Ireland.16
Under these circumstances attendance and interest in the proceedings of Parliament have declined. Important bills have been discussed on behalf of the government by comparatively unknown men.
The most prominent speakers have been former Liberal ministers,
formally in opposition, who after presenting their arguments do not
appear on the division lists. The second reading vote on a New
Ministries Bill (to establish the Ministry of Reconstruction) was
carried by a vote of only 92 Ayes to 30 Noes.
More than one British writer has publicly called the new governmental arrangements a constitutional revolution. The general results have been summed up in these words, by Sidney Low:
"For the ministerial and administrative Cabinet collectively responsible to Parliament, officered and recruited entirely from the
Parliamentary circle, intimately related to the House of Commons,
framed on rigid party lines, and conferring with absolute secrecy,
we have a Cabinet which is not a Ministry and a Ministry which is
not a Cabinet; a Cabinet which directs but does not administer; a
Ministry which has exchanged collective responsibility for individual responsibility; a Cabinet which has a very loose connection with
the House of Commons, and for some purposes is virtually independent of it; which stands outside our party divisions; which admits
to its confid~ntial deliberations representatives of all the great States
of ~he Empire as well as those of the United Kingdom; .and which
:11 Herbert Samuel, in Parliamentary Debates, 1917, Vol. 96: 1609.
1s Parliamentary Debates, i917, Vol. 92: 1337.
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still holds private, but no longer in the strictest sense secret, meetings.
"Like most revolutions it is really the result of a long process of
evolution. * * * The Inner Cabinet had long existed in a more or
le~s unacknowledged form. Mr. Asquith regularized the Inner.Cabinet and gave it definite status as the War Cabinet, and he made a
step towards abolishing theTsecret conclave by providing this committee with a secretary.
"Parliamentary control had persisted in form, but had been sensibly relaxed. The war which conferred quasi-autocratic authority
on the Executive diminished it still further; and the formation of
the Coalition reduced it to a shadow. This also went far to release
the Cabinet from the party system and paved the way for a government in which that system is ignored."17
Still another constitutional development of first importance, not
only for the government of the United Kingdom but for the loose
aggregate of British governments vaguely styled the British Empire,
was the sessions in the spring of 1917 of what was called the Imperial Cabinet. This was from one point 9f view an expansion of
the War Cabinet formed in December, 1916; but in other respects
may be considered to have developed from an earlier cabinet committee on imperial defense.

Committee on Imperial Defense
In 1895 a national defense committee of the cabinet had been set
up, with the Prime Minister as chairman. In 1904, after the South
African war, this was reorganized by the Balfour administration as
a committee on imperial defense. As reconstituted this consisted of
the Prime Minister as Chairman; the Secretaries of State for Y..lar,
Foreign Affairs, India an!l the Colonies; the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the First Lord of the Admiralty; the Chief of the General
Staff; the First Sea Lord; the Directors of Naval and Military Intelligence, with Viscount Esher and Field Marshal Lord Nicholson.
Other high imperial and colonial officials were called into the council as occasion required. Records were kept of its conclusions and
of the reasons on which they were based.18
The establishment of this committee was· formally approved by
the House of Commons. While it in no way limited the responsi·
bility of the Cabinet as a whole, it provided machinery by which the
military policy of the country might be, so far as possible, contini1
is

Fortnightly Review, Feb., 1917, pp. 214-5.
Constitutional Year Book, 1916, pp. 20, 67.
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uous, and based upon the authority of the most competent experts.
. Sessions of this committee were held during the Imperial Conferences of 1909 and 1912; and in the latter year Mr. Asquith explained
its organization to the House of Commons. The full coi;nmittee met
on an average six or seven times a year. There were four permanent committees in constant session: on home ports defense, on overseas defense, on the co-ordination of action at the outbreak of war,
and on air matters. There were also other committees on internal
and overseas transport, wireless telegraphy, maintenance of commerce and censorship in time of war. After this s~atement ano.ther
sub-committee was organized on possible invasions or raids. 19
This committee had been active in formulating military policy and
making plans and preparations for war. With the outbreak of the
present war, its activities increased, and its membership tended to
enlarge. A list of those who usually attended the meetings in 1915
includes, besides those noted above, the Minister of Munitions, the
Lord President of the Council, the permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, the Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty,
the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, the Director of Military Operations, the Inspector General of Overseas Forces, and Admirals
Lord Fisher and A. K. Wilson,-making a total of about twenty. 20
From its membership this committee must have dealt to a large
extent with questions of administration and the.execution of policy.

The Imperial Cabinet
Some steps taken earlier in the war foreshadowed the Imperial
Cabinet of 1917. In July, 1915, a meeting of the Cabinet was attended by Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada. In March,
1916, a Cabinet meeting was attended by Mr. W. M. Hughes, Prime
Minister of Australia, who had come to Great Britain, after recent
conferences with the prime ministers of New Zealand and Canada.21
These two isolated, and apparently unpremeditated incidents prepared the way for the more general admission of representatives of
the dominions to the Cabinet.
In December, 1916, after the formation of the Lloyd George Cabinet and Ministry, the British government invited the_govemments
of the overseas dominions and India to a special war conference, in
connection with which there should be held a continuous series of
10 Parliamentary Debates, sth series. Vol. 42: 1385; TT1e Political Quarterly, No. 5,
pp. 67-8.
"°British Imperial Calendar, 1916, p. 365.
01
The Times Histor;,• and Enc;,oclopedia of the War. X, ch. 163, p. 341.
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meetings of the new \Var Cabinet, of which for this conference the
prime ministers of t_he dominions should be members.
The Conference was held during March and April, including representatives from Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand and ~outh
Africa, and also from India. All the self-governing dominjons .were
represented, except Australia, where a parliamentary election required the presence of the leading ministers at home. The Secretary
of State for the Colonies presided; and other ministers and permanent officials of the United Kingdom attended, but not the Prime
Minister nor other members of the War Cabinet. This Conference
considered political and commercial matters of joint concern; its
proceedings were reported and, in part, made public; but like previous Imperial Conferences it was only an advisory body with no positive authority.22
During the same period, meeting as a rule on alternate days to the
Imperial Conference, were held the sessions of the Imperial War
Cabinet. This included the Prime Minister and the other members
of the War Cabinet; the Secretaries of State for India and the Colonies; and also Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada; Wm.
Massey and Joseph Ward, Premier and Finance Minister of New
Zealand; Sir Edward Morris from Newfoundland; General-Smuts
from South Africa; and the Maharajah of Bikanir and Sir S. P.
Sinha from India. The representatives of India and the dominions
were not merely witnesses and advisers, but in effect ministers without portfolio, deliberating under the privy councillor's oath.
No official report of the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet has been
published; but it was announced that at the final session the Prime
Minister proposed that meetings of an Imperial Cabinet should be
held annually, or at any intermediate time when matters of urgent
imperial concern require to be settled. "The Imperial Cabinet will
consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of
his colleagues as deal specially with imperial affairs, of the Prime
Minister of each of the dominions, or of some specially accredited
alternate possessed of equal authority, and of a representative of
the Indian people to be appointed by the government of India." 23
In the concluding resolutions of the Imperial Conference, it was
voted that the readjustment of constitutional relations of the British
governments should be postponed to a special Imperial Conference
to be called after the war; and "that any such readjustment, while
thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and
"'Sidney Low, in Nineteenth Century, August, 1917, p. 23423 J. B. Firth, in Fonnighlly Review, August, 1917, p. 197·
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complete ·control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full
recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial
Commonwealth and of India as an important portion of the same,
should recognize their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy
and in foreign relations and should provide effective arrangements
for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern and for such necessary concerted action founded on
consultation as the several Governments may determine."
These developments mark important steps in the reconstruction of
the Constitution, both of the United Kingdom and what has been
formally called the British "Imperial Commonwealth."
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it indicates a further
departure from the collective responsibility of the Cabinet to the
House of Commons. The connection of the House with the new.War
Cabinet is but slight. The House did not vote Mr. Asquith out; nor
did it vote.in Lloyd George and his associates. But if the House of
Commons has been losing control over the Cabinet of the United
Kingdom, how much less likely is it to control the new Imperial
Cabinet? How can the British Parliament be the final authority in
deciding policies which will be framed and executed in part by
statesmen in no way responsible to British or Irish electorates? It
would seem to be impossible for a national parliament to exercise effective control over what in effect will 'he an international executive.
In the direction of imperial organization, the new Imperial Cabinet is established as the comer stone of the new system. And it has
been recognized both by those opposed and those in favor of an organization based on the federal idea, that the steps taken signify
that the development is proceeding on lines away from the plan of an
imperial federation.
Nevertheless the problem remains as to how the Imperial Cabinet
shall be held responsible and to whom.
The formation of the Allied War Council in the autumn of 1917
marked another change in political institutions of the highest importance,· with significant effects on the workings of the several allied
governments. But an international agency of this kind lies outside
the scope of this study ; an analysis of its actual and probable results
belongs rather to the field of international problems.
In operation the new British War Cabinet and Ministry has appeared to be more active and aggressive than the Coalition Cabinet.
The creation of new ministries showed an attempt to meet the pressing problems of the war by new administrative machinery. Some
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effort was made to deal with the troublesome question of Ireland;
the problem of parliamentary reform was taken in hand, and the
bold decision to call an imperial cabinet marked an important step
towards a more effective organization of the Empire.
At the same time there has been evidence of internal difficulties
and some criticism of the new machinery; and a number of changes
have been made in the War Cabinet and also in the Ministry. In
May, 1917, Mr. Henderson, the Labour member in the War Cabinet,
was replaced by Mr. Barnes, while the former was on a mission to
Russia; and after his return differences with his colleagues led to
the definitive retirement of Mr. Henderson from the government.
It appeared· that even before the critical point had been reached, Mr.
Henderson had not been freely admitted to meetings of the Cabinet;
but his resignation emphasized the continuation of the principle that
the members of the Cabinet must be unanimous in their public ex-,
pressions.
On the other hand the resignation of Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State for India (in July, 1917), on the adverse report of
an investigation into the first Mesopotamian campaign, indicated
that outside of the new cabinet the individual responsibility of ministers was tending to replace the collective responsibility -0f the
group. Several important changes .in both Cabinet and ministry
were made at that time. Mr. Bonar Law retired from the War
Cabinet, though continuing as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir
Edward Carson was transferred from the Admiralty to the Cabinet
-changes which further weakened the connection between the Cabinet and the HQuse of Commons. Several other changes were made
in the Ministry, including the return of Winston Churchill to office
as Minister of Munitions. More recently additional changes have
been made, both in the War Cabinet and the Ministry.
In Parliament Mr. Law has not proven a supreme leader; and on
several occasions Mr. Asquith, from the Opposition bench, has demonstrated his continued leadership of the House, and has saved the
government in critical situations.
The meetings of the Imperial Cabinet involved a considerable addition to the group of five, which had been supposed t~ be an ideal
number for securing prompt and effective decisions. After the other
colonial ministers had departed, General Smuts, the representative
from South Africa, continued to attend sessions of the War Cabinet; and this gave rise to question in the House of Commons as to
his status in the government.
Practical experience also indicated that it was difficult, if not impossible, to divorce general policy from questions of administration.
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Lord Curzon admitted in the House of Lords that most of the time
of the War Cabinet was occupied in the adjustment of internal disputes between the ministers. New departments, boards, commissions and committees continued to be established, until the total
number was more than 300 ;2 "' and it became evident that the multiplication of such agencies raised as many problems as it solved.
Questions arose as to the jurisdiction of the Food Controller and the
President of the Board of Agriculture. The Ministry of Munitions
became in large part an extension of the former labor conciliation
department of the Board of Trade. Yet a. new Ministry of Labour
was created. The Director of the new department of National Service resigned because he had nothing to do. The reconstruction committee practically abandoned its problems; and the proposed new
Ministry of Reconstruction was generally ridiculed.25 The cre·ation
of new departments, indeed, involved a process of decentralization
which contrasted with the policy of centralized control which the
\Var Cabinet was supposed to typify.
In the conduct of the war, no broad and coherent policy and no
effective means of systematic control over the numerous departments
seem to have been developed. Nor was there, until the end of 1917,
any approach to a clear definition of satisfactory terms of peace.
A well known writer views "with some misgiving the recent arrangements by which the Cabinet is to a great extent cut off from
the great offices which carry on the several branches of the actual
government, and by which a· secretari~t is interposed between the
supreme governing committee and those offices." 2 a
Criticism arose in some quarters because the Cabinet did not .confine its attention to war problems. But the unwieldy multiplicity of
ministries. departments, and other agencies badly needed some balance wheel ; and the more serious defect was that the Cabinet did
not prove a sufficiently effective agency of control.
The problem of administrative organization is not one to be settled by any simple principle or catchword of centralization or decentralization. It involves a careful and systematic division of functions, and arrangements for effective co-ordination and correlation
between the different agencies.
"See Lists in Parliamc11lary Papers, 1915, Cd. 7855; 1917, Cd. 8741; Liberal Year
Book, 1917, pp. 148-165; The Nation's Business, Nov., 1917.
:s New Republic, XII, 90-92 (August a5, 1917).
:>o Spencer Wilkinson, in Nineteenth Centur::>o, Jan., 1918, p. 45·
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ASQUITH :MINISTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury .............. . H. H. Asqzsith
Lord President of the Council ............•.......•........ . Earl Beauchamp
Chancellor of the Exchequer .................•....... . David Lloyd George
Ministers without Portfolio .............•........•............... - - - -

Lord Chancellor .....•...•.......•.........•..........•. Viscount Haldane
Lord Privy Seal ..........•....•..•••............... .• Marquess of Crewe
Minister of Munitions .......•.....•...••....................... - - - Secretaries of State:
Home Office •.........•.................... ...•.•.. Reginald McKenna
Foreign Affairs .....•....•...•.•...••...•........•. .Sir Edward Grey
\Var Office ..........•.........•........................ . Earl Kitchener
Colonial ..•.•..•.•••...•..•...•..•.........•....•.... . Lewis Harcourt
India •..................•........•.••...•....•... .. Marquess of Crewe
First I,ord of the Admiralty .....•....•......••.••.•••... Winston q1urchill
Chief Secretary for Irel~nd ......................•...•.. . Augustine Birrell
President of the Board of Education ....•.....•........... .Joseph A. Rease
President of the Ifoard of Agriculture and Fisheries .......•.... . Lord Lucas
President of the Local Government Board .......•.••.••..• . Herbert Samieel
President of the Board of Trade ...•....................• Walter Rt1nci111an
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster ....•........ . Edwin Samuel Montagu

Names in Italics are of members of the Asquith Cabinets. Those in small capitals
are of members of the new War Cabinet.
1 Held same position in Asquith Ministry.
•Resigned in ll!ay. Position vacant until Henry E. Duke was appointed in July.
•Resigned in May. Position vacant until reappointed in August.
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COALITION MINISTRY
Jum: 3, 1915.

WAR MINISTRY,
DECEMBJ>R 10, 1916.

H. H. Asquith (L) •••••..•••...•••• DAVID LLOYD GEORGE (L).
Marquess of Crewe (L) •......••••• EARL CURZON (U).
Reginald McKenna (L) ••••••..•••• BONAR LAW (U).'
Marquess of Lansdow11e (U) .•...•• V1scouNT MILNER (U).
•• • • .•••.•••••••••••••..••.•.•••...• ARTHUR H:END:ERSON (Lab.).G
•••••..•••••••.•.••.•.••.•.••.•.•••. G:EORGS N. BARNES (Lab.) (May,
. • . . • . . • • . • •. • • . • •• • • . • • . . •• . • •• • . • •
1917).
.
.••..•..••.••••..•.•••.•.•.•.••..••• SIR EDWARD CARSON (U)' (July,
••••• .• • •••.•••.. ••• ••• . •• • . •• •.• • .•
1917.
Lord Buckmaster (L) •.••••.••.•••. Sir Robert B. Finlay (U).
Earl Curzon (U) ••..........•...... Earl of Crawford (U).
David Lloyd George (L) •.•....•••.• Dr. Christopher Addison (L).
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) (June, Winston Churchill (July, 1917).
1916) ••.••.....•.•..•.•.••••..•
Sir Johti A. Simon (L) •••....•••.•. Sir George Cave (U).
Herbert Samuel (L) (Jan., 1916) •.•
Sir Edward Grey (L) .............. Arthur J. Balfour (U).
Earl Kitchener .................... •Earl of Derby (U).
David Lloyd George (L) (June,
1916) ••.••.•••••••••.••..•.....
Bonar Law (U) •................... Walter Long (U).
Austen Chamberlain (U) .........•• Austen Chamberlain (U).
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) (July,
1917).
Arthur J. Balfour (U) ........•.•.• Sir Edward Carson (U).
Sir Eric Geddes (July, 1917).
A11gustine Birrell (L)x,2 ..•...•.•••• Henry E. Duke (U).
Henry E. Duke (U) (July, 1916) ••.•
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) •••.••.•••. Herbert A. L. Fisher.
Marquess of Crewe (L) (Aug., 1916)
Lord Selborne ..................... Rowland E. Prothero (U).
Earl of Craiuford (U) (June, 1916).
Walter Long (U) ••.••.•.•••..••.•• Lord Rhondda (L).
W. Ha-yes Fisher (U) (July, 1916) •.
Walter R1mci111an (L) 1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Sir Albert Stanley (U).
Winston Churchill (L) .••.•...•.... Sir Frederick Cawley (L).
Herbert Samuel (L) (Nov., 1915) .•.
Edwin S. Montagu (L) (Jan., 1916)
T. McKimio1i Wood (L) (June,
1916) ••••••.••.•..•..•...••••...
'Bonar Law resigned from the War Cabinet and was succeeded by Sir Edward Car·
son, but continued as Chancellor of the Exchequer.
•Henderson, while on a mission to Russia, was replaced° by Barnes, but never returned to an active part in tltc \\"ar Cabinet.
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Secretary for

Sc~tland .............•..•.•......•. ..... T.

McKinnon Wood

First Commissioner of Works ......•.•...••.......•...•.•. ••• Lord Emmott
Attorney-General •.•••.•.•••..•...... : ••......•...•... . Sir John A. Simon
Minister of Blockade ••.......•....................•.....•.•••.•- - - Food Controller ..•.••...••....•...•....•........•.•...........•.- - - Shipping Controller· .........•...•.•• : .•.....•....•....•...•.... - - - Minister of Labour : .•.••.•..•..•....•.••.......•.•••.•..•......- - - Minister of Pensions •..••••....•..•.....••..•..•.•..•.•••.•.... - - - Air Board ..................•.................•................- - - War Trade Department ...•.............................•......- - - -

Ministry of National Service ...........•••...•................•- - - Ministry of Reconstruction .••.....••...•...............•.••••••--.- Postmaster-General ....••.•..•.••.........•.......•.•. . C. E. H. Hobhouse
Under-Secretaries of State:
Home Office ..•••.••.....•.•....••.....••.......•.•••••••• Ellis Griffith
Cecil Harmsworth (Feb., 1915)
Foreign Affairs ••••.•.....•.••.........•.•••••.•. Francis Dyke"'Acland
Hon. Neil Primrose (Feb., 1915)
Colonial Office •.....•..•...•..•.....•.....•••.••••••... Lord Islington
War Office ....•...•....•....•.•....•..•.•.•..••• Harold John Tennant
. India •••••.•..••..•••...•.. , ·· .••..•..••.........•..•..•• C. H. Roberts
Parliamentary Secretaries: to the Admiralty .....•...••..•.. T. J. Macnamara
Board of Education •..•........•............•• Dr. Christopher Addison
Board of Trade •..••..•.•••.............•..•.••...•.•. J. M. Robertson
Local Government Board ••....••.•..•...•.•.••...•.. •]. Herbert Lewis
Treasury •..••.......•.••.•........•...•.......•••••. Percy Illingworth
John W. Gulland (Feb., 1915)
Financial Secretary to the Treasury•..••.••••••••.•. Edwin Samuel Montagu
Francis Dyke Acland (Feb., 1915)
Parliamentary Secretary to Munitions Department ..••••.....••••- - - -
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T. McKinnon Wood (L) 1 . . . . . . . . . . . Robert Munro (L).
Harold John Tennant (L) (June,
1916) ......................... .

Lewis V. Harcourt (L) ............ Sir Alfred M. Mond (L).
Sir Edward Carson (U) ..••.••••••. Sir Frederick E. Smith (U).
Sir Frederick E. Smith (U) (Oct.,
1915) ......................... .

- - - ........................... Lord Robert Cecil (U).
Lord Robert Cecil (U) (Feb., 1916).
- - - ........................... Lord Devonport (L).
- - - ........................... Lord Rhondda (L) (June, 1917).
- - - ........................... Sir Joseph Paton Maclay.
- - - .................... : ...... John Hodge (Lab.).
- - - ........................... George N. Barnes (Lab.).
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) (Nov.,
1916) ........................ ..

- - - · ........................... Viscount Cowdray.
Maj. Baird (July, 1916) ........... ..
- - - ...•...•...•••...••.•.•••.. Lord Emmott.
Walter Clive Bridgeman (U) (July, Assist.-Capt. Visct. Walmer (U).
1916) ........................ ..

- - - ........................... Neville Chamberlain.
- - - ........................... Dr. C. Addison (July, 1917).
Herbert Samuel (L) .••...•...••.• Albert Holden Illingworth (L).
J. A. Pease (L) (Jan., 1916) ........
William Brace (Lab.) ............... William Brace (Lab.).

Lord Robert Cecil (U) ............. Lord Robert Cecil (U).
Additional-Lord Hardinge.
Arthur D. Steel-Maitland (U) ...... Arthur D. Steel-Maitland (U).
Harold John Tennant (L) 1 . . . . . . . . . . J. Ian Macpherson,
Earl of Derby (U) (June, 1916) .. ..
Lord Islington (L) ................. Lord Islington (L).
T. J. Macnamara (L) .............. T. J. Macnamara (L).1
Additional-Earl Lytton (U).
J. Herbert Lewis (L) ..•.••.•.•..•. J. Herbert Lewis (L).
Ernest George Pretyman (U) .•.•..• G. H. Roberts Lab.).
William Hayes Fisher (U) .•.•••••.. William Hayes ·Fisher (U).
John W. Gulland (L) 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lord Edmund Talbot (U).
Lord Edmund Talbot (U) .......... Capt. F. E. Guest (L)
(Mar., 1917).
Edwin Samuel Montagu (L) •...•.•. Sir S. H. Lever.
Dr. Christopher Addison (L) ....... Mr. Kellaway (L).
Sir Worthington Evans (U).
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture ...... Sir Harry Verney
Financial Secretary to the War Office ....•.....••..... Harold Trevor Baker
Junior Lord of the Treasuhy ....•.. John W. Gulland (went out Feb., 1915)
Junior Lord of the Treasury ..................•.....•.. W. Wedgwood Benn
Junior Lord of the Treasury ..........•..•..................• William Jones
Junior Lord of the Treasury ........•.....................•.•....• H. Webb
Junior Lord of the Treasury ...................••. Walter Rea (Feb., 1915)
Junior Lord of the Treasury .....•....... ."...... _.•. Cecil Beck (Feb., 1915)
Civil Lord of the Admiralty ............•.......•..•.••..... George Lambert
Solicitor-General ....•...........•...•.•........... Sir Stanley Buckmaster
Paymaster-General .......................................... Lord Strachie
Assistant Postmaster-General ..........••....•.......... Capt. Cecil Norton
Parliamentary Secretaries: to the National Service Ministry ...... - - - Air Board •.....••...........•.•..•••••...•...............•.- - - Food Control Ministry ..•...•..............................- - - Minister of Pensions ...........•.•....•.................•..- - - Shipping Controller .....•..•.....•.................••.•..••- - - Minister of Blockades ............•...•.•..••..•.•......•••.- - - Minister of Labour ........•......•.....•.....•.........•.. - - - Assistant Under-Secretary Foreign Affairs •......•...•.••.••..•.•- - - Scotland:
Secretary for ......•....•..•..............•..... .• T. McKinnon Wood
Lord Advocate ..........•.•...•...•.•.........••..••.•. Robert Munro
Solicitor-General •.•.•.....•..•.•.••.•.•••..... Thomas Brash Morison
Ireland:
Lord Lieutenant •..•..•..••.....•...••••••..•••...... Earl of Aberdeen
Lord Wimborne (Feb., 1915)
Chief Secretary ......••........•.••............•..• . Augustine Birrell
Lord Chancellor .....................•......••...•• Ignatius J. O'Brien
Attorney-General .....••.•..•.••.•..•..............••..•. Jonathan Pim
Solicitor-General .........• ; .••........•...•.•••.•..•. James O'Connor
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Francis Dyke Acland (L) •..••.•..• Sir R. Winfrey {L).
Duke of Marlborough.
Henry William Forster (U) ••.••..• Henry William Forster (U).
Geoffrey Howard (L) •.•.•.•••••••. James F. Hope (U).
G. H. Roberts (Lab.) ••.••••••••••.• J. W. Pratt (L).
Walter Clive Br.idgeman (U) •••.•.• Stanley Baldwin (U).
Walter Rea (L) ••.••••••••.•.•...•• James Parker (Lab.).
Towyn Jones (L).
Duke of Devonshire •••••••••••••••• Ernest George Pretyman (U).
Sir Arthur Lee (June, 1916) ••••••••
Earl Lytton (U) (Oct., 1916) •••••••
Sir Frederick E. Smith (U) •••••••• Sir Gordon Hewart (L).
Sir George Cave (U) (Oct., 1915) ••
Lord Newton ..••.•....••.•.••••••• Sir J. Compton-Rickett.
Arthur Henderson (Lab.) (Oct.,
1916} •••....•.•.•••••••••••••••
~--

---------

.....•.....••••••••..•••••. H. Pike Pease (U).
•••••.........•.......•••.. Stephen Walsh.
.•.•........•.•••••..••••.. Maj. Baird.
.
•....................•.••.. Capt. Charles Bathurst (U).
............•.............. Col. Sir Arthur Griffith Boscawen
(U).

- - - .....................•.••.• Sir L. G. Chiozza Money (L).
- - - ..•............•..•.••..•.• Rt. Hon. F. Leverton Harris (U).
- - -.•.•.•......•.•.•...•..••••• Walter Clive Bridgeman (U).
Lord Newton (Oct., 1916) •••••••••• Lord Newton.

T. McKinnon Wood (L) 1 • • • • • • • • • • • Robert Munro (L).
Harold John Tennant (L) (June,
1916) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Robert Munro (L) 1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • James A. Clyde (U).
Thomas Brash Morison (L) 1 •••••••• Thomas Brash Morison (L).1
Lord Wimborne (L)' .•..••••••....• Lord Wimborne (L).

Augustine Birrell, 1, 2 ••••••••••••••• Henry E. Duke (U).
Henry E. Duke (U) (July, 1916) ••••
Ignatius J. O'Brien (L) 1 •••••••••••• Ignatius J. O'Brien (L).1
John Gordon (U) .••••.••.••••••••• James O'Connor (L).
J. H. M. Campbell (March, 1916) •••
James O'Connor (L)1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • James Chambers (U).
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Ministers of the Royal Household:
Lord Steward •••.....••.................••.••.•..• Earl of Chesterfield
Treasurer •.•.•.••..•••...••. ; •....•.•.•.....•. Capt Hon. F. E. Guest
Comptroller •.•...•..•..•••.....•..•.••..••.••••..• Lord Saye and Sele
Lord Chamberlain •....•........•.•.•••••...•..••••••.. Lord Sandhurst
Vice-Chamberlain .....••..•............••....•• Hon. Geoffrey Howard
Lord in Waiting ••.•....••....•...••......•.•....•..••• Lord Herscheli
Lord in Waiting ......•..•••..•.........•.•..•....•••.. Lord Allendale
Lord in Waiting ..•............••.•....••••••...••.••.• Lord Stanmore
Lord in Waiting ..•.......•...••.......•.•..••..••. Lord Ranksborough
Lord in Waiting .•.••..•......••....••..•....••.•.....•. Lord Granville
Lord in Waiting •.••••••.•...••..••.•.•....•.•...•..••..••. Lord Acton
Captain of Gentlemen-at-Arms .•...••....••.•.......•• Lord Colebrooke
Captain of Yeomen of Guard ............•.............. Earl of Craven
Master of the Horse ...•...•.•.•........••..........•.. Earl of Granard

If an outsider may venture an opinion, there is need for a still
more radical reorganization of the British administrative system,
affecting not only the Cabinet, but the numerous ministerial departments. The number of main departments should be reduced; and
the less important services organized within one or the other of the .
main departments. For example, it might be welJ to combine the
ministries of foreign and colonial affairs. There could be a single
ministry of military operations, embracing the army, the navy, the
air service, and the munitions service. A comprehensive ministry
of home or internal affairs might absorb the functions of the Home
Secretary, the Local Government Board, the Board of Agriculture
and the Food Controller. A ministry of trade and commerce could
take over the work of the Board of Trade and the Shipping Controller.
If the number of main departments were thus reduced to ten or
twelve, many of the con~icts between what are now distinct minis-
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Lord Farquhar (U) •.....•...••.... Lord Farquhar (U).
James F. Hope (U) ..........•...•• Col. James Craig (U).
Charles Roberts (L) ...•...........• Sir Edwin Cornwall (L).
Lord Sandhurst (L) ....•........... Lord Sandhurst (L).1
Cecil Beck (L) ••................... Cecil Beck (L).
Lord Herschell (L) 1 •••••••••••••••• Lord Herschell (L).1
Lord Allendale (L) 1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Lord Kenyon (L).
Lord Stanmore (L) 1 •••••••••••••••• Lord Stanmore (L).1
Lord Ranksborough (U) 1 • • • • • • • • • • • Lord Ranksborough (U) .1
Lord Valentia (U) ....•...........• Lord Valentia (U).
Lord Hylton (U) .•.••.•......••.... Lord Hylton (U).
Lord Colebrooke (L) 1 •••••••••••••• Lord Colebrooke (L).1
Lord Suffield (U) .•................ Lord Suffield (U).
Earl of Chesterfield (L) •........•.. Earl of Chesterfield (L).

tries could. be settled within the department. A Cabinet of workable
size could then be set up, including the ministers at the head of each
of the main departments, with the Prime Minister as the general director of the whole system. Such a Cabinet might combine the advantages of centralized control aimed at in the Lloyd George government with those of the old Cabinet system, which linked the central
council with the administrative services and with Parliament.
Such an organization would also lend itself to the further development of imperial organization. The five or six ministers dealing
with imperial problems could sit with the colonial premiers and a
representative from India in an imperial cabinet which would also
be small enough for effective results ; while imperial con£erences
held from time to time with more representatives from the overseas
dominions would form a deliberative agency for the consideration
of larger questions of policy.
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